投贷联动业务创新模式选择的激励机制研究  被引量:3

Research on Incentive Mechanism of Innovation Mode Selection for Investment and Loan Linkage

在线阅读下载全文

作  者:张建刚[1] 康宏[1] 康健 ZHANG Jiangang;KANG Hong;KANG Jian(College of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, China;College of Science, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China)

机构地区:[1]山东科技大学经济管理学院,山东青岛266590 [2]东北大学理学院,辽宁沈阳110004

出  处:《科学与管理》2019年第1期8-18,共11页Science and Management

基  金:国家社会科学基金后期资助项目(16FJY008);青岛市软科学研究计划项目(16-5-2-1-(12)-CHX)

摘  要:投贷联动业务是解决科创型企业融资难问题的有效尝试,然而,商业银行参与度不高是影响投贷联动业务发展的主要问题。运用委托代理理论对投贷联动不同模式构建了委托代理动态博弈模型,分析了商业银行参与方式对各方收益的影响及对商业银行、风险投资公司和创业企业准入限制的影响机制。研究发现商业银行、风投公司共同运作时可以充分发挥银行和风投公司各自的优势。最后根据我国市场发展特点,提出具有可行性的投贷联动业务两种模式选择:借道创投孵化器的股权投资基金模式和第三方投资机构合作的紧密型模式。Investment and loan linkage business is an effective attempt to solve the financing difficulties of science and technology-based enterprises. However, the low participation of commercial bank is a key factor affecting the development of investment and loan linkage. In this paper, principal-agent theory is used to build a dynamic model of principal-agent dynamic game for different modes of investment and loan linkage. The paper analyzes the influence of banks' participation on the income of all parties and the influence mechanism of the three parties' access restrictions. The study found that when commercial banks and venture capital companies work together, they can give full play to the advantages of both banks and venture capital firms. According to the characteristics of China's market development, it proposes two modes of investment and loan linkage: the mode of equity investment fund through the venture capital incubator and the close cooperation model of third-party investment institutions.

关 键 词:投贷联动 委托代理模型 商业银行 科技金融 

分 类 号:F832.4[经济管理—金融学]

 

参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

耦合文献:

正在载入数据...

 

引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

同被引文献:

正在载入数据...

 

相关期刊文献:

正在载入数据...

相关的主题
相关的作者对象
相关的机构对象