基于拆量思想的两轮逆向拍卖机制设计  

Mechanism design of two-round reverse auction based on quantity split

作　　者：王娜 汪定伟[2] 王洪峰[2] 王晓梅[2] WANG Na;WANG Dingwei;WANG Hongfeng;WANG Xiaomei(Department of Basic Computer and Mathematics, Shenyang Normal University, Shenyang 110034, China;School of Information and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819, China)

机构地区：[1]沈阳师范大学计算机与数学基础教学部,沈阳110034 [2]东北大学信息科学与工程学院,沈阳110819

出　　处：《沈阳师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2018年第6期556-561,共6页Journal of Shenyang Normal University:Natural Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目(61703290)

摘　　要：政府和大型企业集团在集中采购某一单一种类的物资时,其采购量通常远远超过单个供应商的供应能力,这就需要多个供应商同时提供合同。为了降低这种单一种类商品网上集中采购的成本,提出了一种基于拆量思想的两轮逆向拍卖机制。在第一轮拍卖中,竞价人允许自由投标,拍卖人对竞价人的自由投标策略进行分析,依据最优期望采购效益原则将总采购量进行合理拆分,形成第二轮拍卖的招标方案;在第二轮拍卖中,竞价人仅允许对拆量方案进行投标,采购人依据最小化采购成本原则确定最终胜标的竞价人。数值实验表明,这种新型的两轮逆向拍卖机制不仅能够增加胜标者确定问题的可行解数量,更能够为拍卖人带来很好的经济收益。When government departments and large enterprise groups concentrate on purchasing a single type of goods,their procurement quantity usually far exceed the capacity of any individual supplier,which requires multiple suppliers to provide goods together.In order to decrease the procurement cost,a two-round division-based reverse auction mechanism is proposed in this paper.In the first round auction,the bidders are allowable to bid freely and the auctioneer would divide the total procurement quantity into multiple bundles based on the bidding results of bidders so as to achieve the optimal expected procurement benefit.In the second round auction,the bidders are only allowable to bid for the divided bundles and the auctioneer would determine the final winning bidders according to the minimal procurement cost.The numerical results indicate this new tworound reverse auction mechanism does not only increase the feasible solutions’ number for winner determination problem,but achieve the good economic saving.

关 键 词：集中采购 逆向拍卖 拆量 拍卖机制设计 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]