奥利弗·哈特“不完全合同理论”评述  

A review of Oliver Hart's incomplete contract theory

作　　者：张玉卓[1] ZHANG Yu-zhuo(School of Economics, Tianjin University of Commerce, Tianjin 300134, China)

机构地区：[1]天津商业大学经济学院,天津300134

出　　处：《天津商业大学学报》2019年第2期47-54,共8页Journal of Tianjin University of Commerce

摘　　要：不完全合同理论的基本思想是财产权利分配,这种科学的洞见基于半个多世纪企业与产权理论的积累和创新,包括:科斯1937年的《企业性质》的发现和1960年《社会交易成本》的预见;格鲁斯曼和哈特1986年的《所有权的成本与收益》一文离开了克莱茵和威廉姆逊等人的一体化可以解决交易成本问题的思路,初步提出了"决策权配置"的新思路,从而把契约不完全性与产权配置的决定性作用合理结合,随后对产权理论进行深化研究。The basic idea of the incomplete contract theory is the distribution of property rights. This scientific insight is based on the accumulation of and innovation in the enterprise and property rights theory over more than half a century. It includes the discovery and the foresight in“The Nature of the Firm”(1937) and “The Problem of Social Cost”(1960), which Coase proposed. Grossman and Hart discarded the idea that integration could solve the problem of transaction cost, which was proposed by Klein, Williamson and others, and proposed the new idea of“decision right allocation” preliminarily in“The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration”(1986), in which they combined the incompleteness of contract with the decisive role of property right allocation rationally and deepened the research on property right theory.

关 键 词：不完全合同 企业边界 交易成本 GHM模型 剩余控制权 

分 类 号：F0-08[经济管理—政治经济学]