失信联合惩戒机制与供给侧结构性改革的相关理论研究  

Theoretical Study on Joint Dishonesty Disciplinary Mechanism and Supplyside Structural Reform

作　　者：刘洪波[1] 卢盛羽 Liu Hongbo;Lu Shengyu(Research Center for the Development of Modern Credit Services Industry, Guangdong University of Finance, Guangzhou 510521, Guangdong, China;Macroeconomic Information Analysis Center of Guangdong, Guangzhou 510030, Guangdong, China)

机构地区：[1]广东金融学院现代信用服务业发展研究中心,广东广州510521 [2]广东省宏观经济信息分析中心,广东广州510030

出　　处：《征信》2019年第2期14-19,共6页Credit Reference

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(17YJC630083);广东省哲学社会科学"十二五"规划项目(GD15XYJ11);广东金融学院"创新强校工程"项目(20170502137)

摘　　要：近年来,供给侧结构性改革大力推进。在此背景下,社会信用体系建设取得了一定的成效,尤其是失信联合惩戒逐步成为全社会关注的焦点问题。失信联合惩戒机制之所以特别重要,原因在于其比较深厚的理论基础,主要包括信息不对称理论、博弈论、交易成本理论、信用风险管理理论。供给侧结构性改革当前的重要任务是"三去一降一补",失信联合惩戒机制则有助于推进供给侧结构性改革。The supply-side structural reform has been vigorously promoted in recent years and the construction of social credit system, against this background, has achieved certain accomplishments, among which the joint dishonesty disciplinary mechanism has gradually become the focus of the attention of the whole society. The reason why this mechanism is so especially important is that it has relatively deep theoretical basis, mainly including information asymmetry theory, game theory, transaction cost theory, and credit risk management theory. The priority task of the supply-side structural reform is cutting overcapacity, reducing excess inventory, deleveraging, lowering cost, and strengthening areas of weakness and the joint dishonesty disciplinary mechanism helps to promote the supply-side structural reform.

关 键 词：供给侧结构性改革 失信联合惩戒 社会信用体系建设 信用信息共享 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学]