银行业协会履职行为激励约束机制研究  

Research on incentive and constraint mechanism for the behavior of banking association

作　　者：于晓冉 于涛 YU Xiaoran;YU Tao(School of Business,Shandong Normal University,Jinan 250014,P.R.China)

机构地区：[1]山东师范大学商学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《重庆大学学报（社会科学版）》2019年第3期57-71,共15页Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目"我国区域产品质量影响因素分析及监管对策研究"(13AGL012);山东省自然科学基金面上项目"基于演化博弈的产品质量协同监管机制研究"(ZR2016GM10);山东省自然科学基金青年项目"企业绿色产品合作网络影响因素及演化博弈研究"(ZR2017QG003)

摘　　要：针对银行业协会履职行为的激励约束问题,在系统分析银行业协会履职过程中主体间关系的基础上,将会员机构与政府主管部门对银行业协会履职行为的声誉激励与监管威慑制约作用置于同一框架下研究,构建了不完全信息银行业协会履职行为激励约束多方动态博弈模型,并通过求解博弈精炼贝叶斯准分离均衡战略条件,分析并仿真研究了声誉激励与监管威慑两种激励约束机制对银行业协会履职行为的作用原理。研究结果表明,先期声誉、声誉激励、市场识别能力及远期收益贴现为声誉激励的主要构成要素,监管查处能力、监管处罚为监管威慑的主要构成要素;良好的先期声誉能够在一定程度上促进行业自律的形成,但协会负责人的固定任职期限会在一定程度上削弱声誉激励的有效作用;监管威慑在发挥自身约束作用的基础上,能够促进声誉激励作用的有效发挥,但需以畅通有效的信息机制建设为前提。结合研究结果及实际,分别从提升银行业协会内控机制建设,强化银行业信息互通机制建设及适度提升政府主管部门的监督力度等方面提出了政策建议。Focusing on effectiveness of incentive and restraint mechanism for performance-duty behavior of banking industry association, this paper studies the reputation incentive from members of banking industry association and regulatory deterrence from government authorities based on systematic analysis of inter-subject relationship under the same framework. By building incomplete information multi-dynamic game, we get the refined Bayesian quasi segregation equilibrium strategic conditions of the game, analyze and discuss the impact mechanism of reputation incentive and regulatory deterrence by simulation analysis using Matlab. The results are as follows: the main indicators of reputation incentive include prior reputation, unit reputation incentive,market identification capability and forward yield discount;the main indicators of regulatory deterrence include investigation ability and regulatory penalties, which can impel or restrict the behaviors of banking industry association effectively. Good reputation can promote the formation of self-discipline, but the fixed service term of the head of association will weaken reputation incentive efficiency;regulatory deterrence can promote reputation incentive on the premise that build a smooth and effective information mechanism. Considering the results and the realities, we give suggestions on improving the construction of internal control mechanism of banking association, strengthening the construction of banking information exchange mechanism and enhancing the supervision of government departments moderately.

关 键 词：银行业 行业协会 履职行为 声誉激励 监管威慑 

分 类 号：C931.3[经济管理—管理学] F224.32