P2P网络借贷市场的双边拍卖机制设计  

Bilateral auction mechanism design in online peer-to-peer lending market

作　　者：周正龙[1,2] 马本江 胡凤英[1] ZHOU Zheng-long;MA Ben-jiang;HU Feng-ying(Business School,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China;School of Information Management,Central China Normal University,Wuhan 430079,China)

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,长沙410083 [2]华中师范大学信息管理学院,武汉430079

出　　处：《控制与决策》2019年第3期628-636,共9页Control and Decision

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71372061);湖南省自然科学基金项目(14JJ2017);中南大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(2017zzts043;2017zzts050)

摘　　要：针对P2P网络借贷交易的双边市场特征,提出一种P2P网络借贷的双边拍卖机制,用于改进国内P2P网络借贷市场的交易机制.首先,证明P2P网络借贷的双边拍卖机制满足激励相容特征,并且存在纳什均衡解.然后,根据该机制定价函数中的激励或惩罚系数,探讨借款人和贷款人的最优拍卖策略,并提供不同情形下的最优定价方案.最后,结合算例分析指出,该机制的定价随着激励或惩罚系数的变化而变化,可以向Prosper拍卖机制或拍拍贷撮合机制转变,并且在不影响机制最优性的前提下,可以调整激励或惩罚系数来改进借款人的支付成本;不同的借款人也可以根据自己对借款需求的紧迫性,自由选择不同情形下的拍卖机制.Based on the bilateral market characteristics of online peer-to-peer(P2P) lending, this paper proposes a bilateral auction mechanism in order to optimize the operating mode of China’s online P2 P lending market. In the process, the paper firstly demonstrates the incentive compatibility features of this auction mechanism, and demonstrates the Nash equilibrium of the mechanism. Then, according to the incentive or punishment coefficient of the pricing function in this mechanism, this paper explores the optimal auction strategy of borrowers and lenders, and offers the best pricing under different scenarios. Finally, the example analysis shows that different incentive or punishment coefficients can change the mechanism to the Prosper auction mechanism or PPDai mechanism, and the payment level of the mechanism changes with the incentive or punishment coefficient. Therefore, without affecting the optimality of the mechanism, the incentive or punishment coefficient can be adjusted to improve the borrower’s payment cost. According to the urgency of the demand for loans, different borrowers can freely choose the auction mechanism under different scenarios.

关 键 词：互联网金融 双边拍卖 机制设计 拍卖策略 最优定价 P2P网络借贷市场 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学] F724.59