双寡头企业信息消费产品定价策略  

The Pricing Strategy of Information Consumption Goods of Duopoly Enterprises

作　　者：张亚明[1] 苏妍嫄 ZHANG Ya-ming;SU Yan-yuan(School of Economy and Management,Yanshan University,Qinhuangdao 066004,China)

机构地区：[1]燕山大学经济管理学院,河北秦皇岛066004

出　　处：《控制工程》2019年第3期542-548,共7页Control Engineering of China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71271186);河北省自然科学基金(G2016203220;G2017203319);教育部人文社会科学基金(17YJCZH109)

摘　　要：将影响信息消费产品价值的消费者忠诚度及网络外部效应引入消费者效用函数,改进传统的Hotelling定价模型,讨论企业单一定价、歧视定价的均衡策略。研究发现,网络外部效应趋于对称时,双寡头企业均采用歧视定价策略,策略选择对消费者忠诚度不敏感;网络外部效应趋于非对称时,随着消费者为保持忠诚愿意支付溢价的增大,二者均衡定价策略由均采用单一定价策略向均采用歧视定价策略转移,且随着网络外部效应差异的增大,策略选择对消费者忠诚度的敏感性减小。By introducing the consumers’ loyalty and the network externality which both have great effects on the value of the information consumption goods into the consumer utility function, this paper improves the traditional Hotelling pricing model, discusses the equilibrium strategies between the uniform pricing and discriminatory pricing. The results show that if the two network externalities tend to be symmetric, both enterprises would choose the discriminatory pricing, and the strategy selection is not sensitive to customers’ loyalty;if the two network externalities tend to be asymmetric, the equilibrium strategies would change from uniform pricing to discriminatory pricing as the premium that consumers are willing to pay in order to keep their loyalty increases Besides, with the increase of the difference between two network externalities, the sensitivity of the strategy selection on customers’ loyalty becomes decreases.

关 键 词：信息消费产品 网络外部效应 HOTELLING模型 单一定价 歧视定价 

分 类 号：TP27[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]