联合风险投资、竞争者间接联结与企业创新  

Venture Capital Syndication, Competitor Indirect Ties and Entrepreneurial Innovation

作　　者：董建卫[1] 施国平 郭立宏[1] DONG Jian-wei;SHI Guo-ping;GUO Li-hong(School of Economics and Management,Northwest University,Xi’an 710127,China;School of Economics and Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China)

机构地区：[1]西北大学经济管理学院,西安710127 [2]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092

出　　处：《研究与发展管理》2019年第2期91-101,共11页R&D Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目"基于网络结构视角的创投网络与企业创新网络互动机理研究"(71702091)

摘　　要：基于竞争性信息泄露假说,本文研究企业通过联合风险投资形成的竞争者间接联结对其自身创新的影响。以清洁技术行业接受A轮风险投资(简称VC)的企业为样本,使用负二项分布模型,研究发现:通过VC联合投资形成的竞争者间接联结数量对企业创新产出有显著的负向影响;VC是否首次联合投资、联合投资VC的地理临近性以及VC的市场地位调节上述关系。论文把竞争性信息泄露假说拓展到VC联合投资层面,提醒企业在寻求VC投资时要注意通过VC联合投资形成的竞争者间接联结对自身创新可能带来的阻碍作用。The impact of competitor indirect ties through venture capital(VC)syndication on entrepreneurial innovation was investigated from the theoretical perspective of competitive information leakage.By collecting samples of A-roundfinancing firms in the clean-technology industry and using the negative binomial model,it finds that indirect ties to competitors through VC syndication impede innovation,and that this effect is moderated by several factors,such as whether or not VC syndicating for the first time,geographical proximity between syndicating partners,and market status of VC.It expands the hypothesis of competitive information leakage to VC syndication area,and reminds entrepreneurial firms that when seeking VC financing,it is necessary to pay caution to the likely negative effect of the hidden competitor indirect ties through VC syndication.

关 键 词：联合风险投资 竞争者间接联结 竞争性信息泄露 企业创新 

分 类 号：F204[经济管理—国民经济]