供应链环境下中小OEM企业安全生产决策的演化  

Work-Safety Strategies Evolution of Small and Medium-Sized OEM Enterprises in Supply Chain

作　　者：仲晶晶 梅强[2] 周巧梅[2] ZHONG Jingjing;MEI Qiang;ZHOU Qiaomei(School of Economics and Management,Changzhou Institute of Technology,Changzhou 213002,China;School of Management,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China)

机构地区：[1]常州工学院经济与管理学院,江苏常州213002 [2]江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《工业工程》2019年第2期19-28,共10页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71874072);教育部人文社会科学青年基金资助项目(19C11055017);江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金资助项目(2018SJA1798);常州工学院高层次人才科研启动资助项目(YN1758)

摘　　要：为研究供应链环境下中小OEM企业安全生产决策的演化规律,构建核心企业与中小OEM企业安全生产决策交互的演化博弈模型,分析了系统均衡点的存在性及稳定性,并通过数值仿真展示出博弈主体不同初始策略和不同收益取值对于系统演化结果的影响。研究发现,博弈主体收益取值范围的不同会影响系统均衡点的个数和稳定性;当系统收敛于(严格监督,严格遵循)的期望模式或(宽松监督,敷衍遵循)的"不良锁定"模式时,可以通过调节相关收益值使其朝期望模式演化。通过激励核心企业履行供应链安全生产治理责任,提高中小OEM企业安全生产投入,进而提高供应链的整体安全水平。The evolutionary rules of work-safety strategies of small and medium-sized OEMs in supply chain are explored.An evolutionary game model,which depicts mutual interactions of different work-safety strategies from core enterprises and small and medium-sized OEMs,is built to analyze the existence and stability of system equilibrium points.The influence from different initial conditions of two agents and different parameters’variations is demonstrated through numerical simulation.It is found that different payoffs affect the stability of equilibrium and the evolutionary trend,and that the system evolves into two different patterns which are respectively“strict supervision and strict compliance”and“loose supervision and perfunctory compliance”.It is feasible to make the system evolve to the former desired pattern through modifying payoffs,avoiding the latter undesired pattern.Based on the conclusion drawn in this research,it’s likely to improve work safety condition of the whole supply chain by encouraging core enterprises to strictly supervise small and medium-sized OEMs.

关 键 词：供应链 安全生产 核心企业 中小OEM企业 演化 

分 类 号：X921[环境科学与工程—安全科学]