具有延保服务的闭环供应链回收渠道选择  

Reverse Channel Choice in a Closed-loop Supply Chain with Extended Warranty Service

作　　者：但颖 代颖[1] 马祖军[1] DAN Ying;DAI Ying;MA Zujun(School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China)

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《工业工程》2019年第2期42-48,共7页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71103149);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(16YJA630005);四川省社会科学研究规划重点资助项目(SC17A030);成都市软科学研究资助项目(2016-RK00-00266-ZF)

摘　　要：针对具有延保服务的闭环供应链(CLSC)回收渠道选择问题,构建了3种回收渠道(制造商回收、零售商回收、第三方回收)和2种延保服务提供者(制造商、零售商)组合而成的6种分散决策CLSC模型,基于博弈论方法研究了每种情形下的最优回收渠道选择及其对CLSC决策的影响。结果表明,无论是制造商还是零售商提供延保,零售商都是产品回收最有效的承担者,此时制造商、零售商和整个CLSC都可以获得最大的利润,且产品回收率也最高。To solve the problem of reverse channel choice in a closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)with extended warranty service,six decentralized CLSC models are developed by combining three typical reverse channel formats(i.e.,manufacturer collecting,retailer collecting,and third-party collecting)and two kinds of extended warranty providers(i.e.,the manufacturer or the retailer).For each scenario,the optimal decision on reverse channel choice and its impact on CLSC decisions are examined based on game theory.The results show that whether the manufacturer or the retailer offers the extended warranty,it is best for the retailer to collect used products.In this context,the manufacturer,the retailer and the whole CLSC all can get their maximum profits and the product return rate is the highest.

关 键 词：闭环供应链 延保 渠道结构 再制造 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]