试论绿色矿山建设的企业行为逻辑  

Discussion on the Enterprise Behavior Logic of Green Mine Construction

作　　者：朱清 王联军 强海洋 ZHU Qing;WANG Lianjun;QIANG Haiyang(Chinese Academy of Natural Resources Economics, Beijing 101149)

机构地区：[1]中国自然资源经济研究院,北京101149

出　　处：《中国国土资源经济》2019年第4期20-25,共6页Natural Resource Economics of China

基　　金：中国地质调查局项目"全国矿产资源勘查开采监测与管理技术支撑"(DD20160091);中国地质调查局项目"全国矿产资源勘查开采调查监测成果集成"(12120113080500);中国地质调查局项目"矿业权管理落实生态文明技术支撑"(2200114)

摘　　要：绿色矿山建设应遵循企业行为规律。传统理论认为,企业追求利益最大化,缺乏治理环境的积极性。政府往往将环境成本纳入企业生产成本,并通过庇古税、押金、禁令等手段来迫使企业进行环境治理。波特假设认为,企业积极遵守政府规制,可以获得规制收益,从而实现"双赢"。文章根据环境治理的两大政策分类,梳理了绿色矿山建设发展的国际政策脉络,指出矿业企业可以通过恢复治理地质环境,主动建设绿色矿山,实现"波特假设"。从国际上广泛使用的企业恢复治理环境最优模型出发,讨论了绿色矿山建设在循环经济、利益调配、零和博弈三个层次的成本收益特点,提出了基于三个层次的制度建议。Green mine construction should follow the rules of corporate behavior. Traditional theory holds that enterprises pursue maximum benefits and lack the enthusiasm for governance. The government often incorporates environmental costs into the company's production costs, and uses the Pigou tax, deposits, and bans to force companies to conduct environmental governance. Porter hypothesized that companies can actively comply with government regulations and gain regulatory revenues to achieve a "win-win". According to the two major policy classifications of environmental governance, the article sorts out the international policy context of green mine construction and development, and points out that mining enterprises can actively build green mines by restoring the geological environment and realize the "Porter Hypothesis". Starting from the internationally widely used enterprise recovery governance environment optimal model, the paper discusses the cost-benefit characteristics of green mine construction in the three levels of circular economy, interest distribution, and zero-sum game, and proposes three levels of system recommendations.

关 键 词：绿色矿山 企业行为 生态文明 

分 类 号：F407.1[经济管理—产业经济] F062.1