从公司治理角度探讨董事注意义务的强化  

Discussion on Strengthening the Duty of Directors from the Perspective of Corporate Governance

作　　者：谭咏怡 TAN Yong-yi(Law School, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen 51$0609China)

机构地区：[1]深圳大学法学院,广东深圳518060

出　　处：《广西政法管理干部学院学报》2019年第1期114-118,共5页Journal of Guangxi Administrative Cadre Institute of Politics and Law

摘　　要：随着我国股权分散趋势下显现的董事会中心主义,董事作为公司经营管理事务的主要决策者权力逐渐扩张。从公司治理的立场上,应从董事作为与不作为两方面使注意义务内容具体化,并明确注意义务标准,一定程度上延伸注意义务受益对象范围至股东与债权人。通过注意义务在制度上的强化确立有效的公司内部董事评估与追责机制,减少低效率的外部诉讼追责模式对公司自治的干预,发挥公司法人独立人格的价值。With the emergence of board centralism under the trend of stock right deconcentration doctrine, the directors’ power as the main decision maker of the company’s management and management affairs has gradually expanded. From the standpoint of corporate governance, the duty of care should be specified with the director’s act and inaction, and the duty standard should be clearly observed. To a certain extent, the scope of the beneficiary object should be extended to the shareholders and creditors. By strengthening the duty of care,the effective evaluation and accountability mechanism of the company’s internal directors is established, and the intervention of the inefficient external litigation model to the company’s autonomy is reduced, and the value of the independent personality of the company’s legal person is exerted.

关 键 词：公司自治 注意义务 董事追责机制 

分 类 号：DF411.91[政治法律—经济法学]