股权众筹中介机构的功能解释与立法规制  

TheFunctional Interpretation and Legislative RegulationofIntermediary Institutions inEquity Crowdfunding

作　　者：杨硕 Yang Shuo(Law Schoolof Nanjing University, Nanjing Jiangsu210093)

机构地区：[1]南京大学法学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《政法论丛》2019年第2期80-91,共12页Journal of Political Science and Law

基　　金：中国法学会项目"股权众筹的制度设计与体系构建研究"(项目编号:CLS(2018)D77);中国法学会青年调研课题"公司机会法律问题实证研究"(项目编号:CLS(2017)Y20)的阶段性研究成果;国家社科基金重大项目"把社会主义核心价值观融入法治建设"(项目编号:18VHJ002);国家社科基金一般项目"民法典编纂后的商事立法研究"(项目编号:17BFX08)

摘　　要：自Coffee教授《看门人机制:市场中介与公司治理》一书出版发行以来,对证券市场"看门人"失败的反思,尤其是"声誉资本"悖论之现象得到详细描述。公募与私募股权众筹在本质上属于证券发行行为,亦是基于传统证券发行制度的创新,其过程中必然无法避免"看门人"的参与。尽管二者在解决信息不对称问题时具有相同的内在需求,但也因各自面临的核心困境不同,衍生出两套相似但有区别的规则体系。因而需从新型中介(顾问、信息整合者、精明的读者)角度,对应对信息不对称工具(信息披露、群体智慧、信用中介)的功能重新进行解释。在构建我国股权众筹"看门人"制度时,应厘清二者规则设计的逻辑基础,不可将其作为通用制度概而论之。Since professor Coffee published his book Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance,thequestions about the function of the Gatekeeper, especially the paradox of Reputation Capital, have been described from multiple perspectives.In essence, Retail Crowdfunding and Accredited Crowdfundingbothare innovations based on the traditional securities issuance system,and Gatekeepers are alsoinevitablein the process. Due to different core dilemmas, they derive two sets of similar but different rule systems, although they face the same internal requirements in solving the Information Asymmetry problem. Therefore,the functions of tools to solve Information Asymmetry(Information Disclosure, Group Intelligence, Credit Intermediary) should be reinterpretedfrom the perspective of new intermediaries(Consultants, Information Integrators, Smart Readers). When constructing the Gatekeeper system of EquityCrowdfunding in China, we should clarify the logical basis of their rule design and should not confusethemwith each other.

关 键 词：证券法 JOBS法案 股权众筹 中介机构 

分 类 号：DF438.7[政治法律—经济法学]