品牌药超高定价的反垄断规制  

Anti-Monopoly Regulation on Excessive Pricing of Brand Drugs

作　　者：曾杨欢 

机构地区：[1]东华理工大学长江学院

出　　处：《价格理论与实践》2018年第7期15-18,共4页Price:Theory & Practice

基　　金：抚州市社会科学规划项目"药品不公平高价行为的反垄断规制"(项目批准号:17sk30)

摘　　要：品牌药超高定价行为产生的原因错综复杂,对该行为是否应当受到反垄断规制一直争论不止。对既有利于激励药企创新又可能损害消费者利益的超高定价,反垄断法规制应特别慎重,避免规制过当造成新的规制失灵。因此,应根据品牌药上市后所处的不同时期"分而治之":对于专利期内的品牌药价格通过谈判机制形成,反垄断法应采取宽容策略不予过度规制,此间的超高定价由政策加以调整;对于专利到期后,品牌药企为维持专利期内的超高定价而实施的诸如产品跳转、自我授权仿制等反竞争行为,反垄断法应该予以规制。The reasons for the excessive pricing of brand drugs are very complicated. There is much debate about whether the price should be regulated by the anti-monopoly law. Excessive Pricing Behaviors are conducive to stimulating innovation of pharmaceutical enterprises and may damage the interests of consumers. So the anti-monopoly regulation system should be especially careful to avoid the regulation failure. Brand drugs of the different periods have been divided into different groups for treatment. The price of brand drugs during the patent period should be formed through negotiation mechanism, and the excessive pricing behavior in this period should be left to government policy-making not the anti-monopoly law. When the patent expires,Anti-competitive behaviors,such as product hopping and self-authorized imitation,implemented to maintain excessive pricing during the patent period by brand pharmaceutical companies which should follow the relative provisions in the anti-monopoly law.

关 键 词：品牌药价格 仿制药价格 专利保护 产品跳转 自我授权仿制 

分 类 号：R95[医药卫生—药学] F426.72[经济管理—产业经济]