民国司法改革中的法官惩戒与政治博弈——以1928年上海临时法院卢兴原撤职案为例  

Judge Disciplinary System and Judicial Reform in Republican China: The Case of Lu Xingyuan in 1928

作　　者：姚尚贤 Yao Shangxian

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学凯原法学院法社会学中心

出　　处：《深圳社会科学》2019年第3期78-86,157,158,共11页Social Sciences in Shenzhen

摘　　要：作为南京国民政府政权建立时接管的上海临时法院,其审判和司法行政制度是南京国民政府司法改革的重要组成部分。以时任上海临时法院院长卢兴原撤职案所引发的法律争论、政治较量及其最后的处理结果,成为民国时代法官惩戒制度乃至司法制度的转折点,改变了清末以来移植的大陆法系法官惩戒模式,影响了南京国民政府时代司法理念的演变、司法制度的定位与设计以及司法与行政关系等多方面状况。当今司法改革推行中如何设计法官惩戒并施行,对于保证司法改革目标的实现具有重要意义,而卢兴原撤职案所提供的历史经验与教训值得重视。The Judge disciplinary system is important in modern society.As the rear valve of the judicial system,its design and operation have a major influence on the judiciary independence.The Shanghai Temporary Court was taken over by the National Government,and therefore the court’s justice administration system was a critical part of the Nanjing National Government's judicial reform.The complicated case of the president the temporary court Lu Xingyuan,which aroused fierce legal controversy and political contention,became a turning point of the development of the country’s judicial system.It influenced the evolution of government’s judicial philosophy and the relationship between the judicial and administrative branches.The case affords us lessons for the judicial reform today.

关 键 词：司法改革 法官惩戒 上海临时法院 民族主义 卢兴原 

分 类 号：D929[政治法律—法学]