Emotional Attachment and Its Limits: Mengzi, Gaozi and the Guodian Discussions  

作　　者：Karyn Lai 

机构地区：[1]School of Humanities and Languages, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia

出　　处：《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2019年第1期132-151,共20页中国哲学前沿（英文版）

摘　　要：Mengzi maintained that both benevolence (ren 仁)and rightness (yi 義)are naturally-given in human nature. This view has occupied a dominant place in Confucian intellectual history. In Mencius 6A, Mengzi's interlocutor, Gaozi, contests this view, arguing that rightness is determined by (doing what is fitting, in line with) external circumstances. I discuss here some passages from the excavated Guodian texts, which lend weight to Gaozi's view. The texts reveal nuanced considerations of relational proximity and its limits, setting up requirements for moral action in scenarios where relational ties do not play a motivational role. I set out yi's complexity in these discussions, highlighting its implications for (i) the nei-wai debate;(ii) the notion of yi as "rightness," or doing the right thing;and (iii) how we can understand the connection between virtue and right action in these early Confucian debates. This material from the excavated texts not only provides new perspectives on a longstanding investigation of human nature and morality, it also challenges prevailing views on Warring States Confucian intellectual history.

关 键 词：CONFUCIAN PHILOSOPHY Mengzi MENCIUS human nature Gaozi GUODIAN cultivation emotions rightness YI and ren 

分 类 号：B[哲学宗教]