政府监管下的网络推手与意见领袖合谋行为研究——基于前景理论的演化博弈分析  

Research on Conspiracy of Internet Marketer and Opinion Leader Under Government Regulation

作　　者：洪巍 王虎 Hong Wei;Wang Hu(Institute for Food Safety Risk Management & Research,Jiangnan University,Wuxi 2141221,China;School of Business,Jiangnan University,Wuxi 214122,China)

机构地区：[1]江南大学食品安全风险治理研究院,江苏无锡214122 [2]江南大学商学院,江苏无锡214122

出　　处：《经济与管理》2019年第3期18-25,共8页Economy and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71303094);江苏省高校哲学社会科学优秀创新团队建设项目(2013-011);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(JUSRP51641A)

摘　　要：引入前景理论,依据网络推手和意见领袖合谋与政府部门三方博弈模型,对网络推手和意见领袖的合谋行为和政府的监管行为分别进行了分析,并通过数值仿真分析不同影响因素对博弈策略的影响。研究结果表明风险态度系数、损失厌恶系数、惩罚力度、合谋成本、声誉损失以及前景理论参数对网络推手和意见领袖均会产生影响。抑制网络推手和意见领袖的合谋行为,政府需要增加合谋成本,降低合谋收益,建立网络推手行为规制的相关法律规范,多方主体协同监管。Based on the prospect theory and the tripartite game model of conspiracy of internet marketer and opinion leader and government department,this paper analyzes the conspiracy of internet marketer and opinion leader and government supervision behavior respectively,and analyzes the influence of different influencing factors on game strategy through numerical simulation.The research results show that risk attitude coefficient,loss aversion coefficient,penalty intensity,conspiracy cost,reputation loss and prospect theoretical parameters have an impact on the internet marketer and opinion leader.To curb the conspiracy behavior of internet marketer and opinion leaders,the government needs to increase the conspiracy cost and reduce the conspiracy benefit;to establish relevant laws and regulations on the regulation of internet marketer behavior;multi-subject coordinated supervision.

关 键 词：网络推手 前景理论 合谋 演化博弈 数值仿真 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] C912.6[社会学]