联保贷款中的策略性违约规避机制设计  

Design of the Mechanism of Avoiding Strategic Defaults in Group Lending

作　　者：张皖婷 何平[1] 徐晓燕[1] ZHANG Wan-ting;HE Ping;XU Xiao-yan(School of Management ,University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China)

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2019年第5期143-148,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71001094,71371176)

摘　　要：针对联保贷款的策略性违约问题,通过对其产生原因的分析以及对现有文献中解决措施的探讨,设计了一个弹性联保贷款合约。该合约的特点在于,随着企业愿意承担的连带责任的增加,企业可获得的期望收益也随之增加,旨在从正面激励企业主动为同伴承担还款责任,达到规避策略性违约的目的。通过数值分析验证了该弹性合约的特性以及适用范围。并进一步在两企业模式基础上进行拓展,讨论了多于两企业的情况下该弹性合约的适用条件。In this paper, focusing on the problem of strategic default, by analyzing the causes of the problems and discussing the countermeasures presented by published documents, a flexible group lending contract is designed. The characteristics of this contract lie in the fact that the available expected utility of enterprises increases along with the increase of the joint liability which enterprises are willing to bear, aiming at positively motivating the enterprises to be liable for repayment of their companions actively, thus realizing the purpose of avoiding strategic defaults. By numerical analyses, the characteristics and scope of application of the flexible contract are tested and verified. Moreover, from discussion under the dual-company pattern, the application conditions of the flexible contract under multiple-company pattern are discussed.

关 键 词：联保贷款 策略性违约 连带责任 停贷惩罚 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]