东亚地区安全架构中的同盟政治与领土争端——以中日钓鱼岛争端和中菲南海争端为例  

Alliance Politics and Territorial Disputes in the East Asian Security Framework: China's Disputes with Japan and the Philippines over Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea

作　　者：李途[1] LI Tu(Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093,China)

机构地区：[1]南京大学,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《太平洋学报》2019年第5期58-72,共15页Pacific Journal

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目"21世纪海上丝绸之路建设与南海战略研究"(14ZDA078)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：尽管关于同盟和同盟承诺的研究成果并不少见,但是"一国会在什么情况下介入盟国与第三方之间的领土主权争端"这一问题并没有得到很好的回答。事实上,同盟关系本身并不足以说明同盟一方是否会介入盟国与第三方的领土主权争端。同盟介入争端的程度和意愿取决于三大因素:同盟条约的规定、介入争端的收益以及同盟牵连的风险。这也是美国在多次公开承诺《美日安保条约》适用于钓鱼岛的同时,拒绝将菲律宾主张的南沙岛礁和黄岩岛纳入《美菲共同防御条约》的重要原因。尽管不应过分夸大同盟在领土争端问题上的威慑作用,但是从其客观影响来看,美国出于自身利益介入东亚地区领土争端,只会激化问题,加剧争端解决的复杂性。Much research has been done on alliance and alliance commitment,but little has addressed the question that under what conditions will a nation intervene in the dispute over territory and sovereignty between its alliance with a third party.In fact,the existence of alliance relations is not the prerequisite that a nation will assist its ally in a territorial dispute.The nation's willingness of intervention and degree of involvement are subject to three factors:alliance obligation,benefits from the intervention,and risks of alliance entanglement.These differences explain why the US officially claimed that the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security applies to dispute over Diaoyu Islands,while refuses to provide its defense commitment to the Philippines when it comes to the South China Sea.Although we should not exaggerate the alliance's deterrence effect on territorial disputes,we need bear in mind that the US's unneutral intervention would only intensify regional disputes in East Asia and aggravate the complexity to a peaceful settlement.

关 键 词：同盟 美国 领土争端 钓鱼岛争端 南海争端 

分 类 号：D815[政治法律—国际关系]