考虑环境性能和再制造能力的闭环供应链讨价还价协调策略  

Bargaining coordination strategy of closed-loop supply chain with consideration of environmental performance and remanufacturability

作　　者：陈胜利[1] 张朝嘉 CHEN Shengli;ZHANG Chaojia(School of Management,Xi'an University of Finance and Economics,Xi'an 710100,China)

机构地区：[1]西安财经学院管理学院

出　　处：《计算机集成制造系统》2019年第5期1283-1295,共13页Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems

基　　金：陕西省社科基金资助项目(2016R013);陕西省社科界2018年重大理论与实现问题研究资助项目(2018Z180)~~

摘　　要：为了研究闭环供应链讨价还价协调策略,在同时考虑产品的环境性能和再制造能力的基础上,构建基于制造商责任延伸(EPR)制度的由制造商回收的闭环供应链模型,分别研究了集中决策和分散式决策模型下的均衡解,并分析了EPR制度对产品环境性能、再制造能力及参与者利润的影响,同时设计了能够实现供应链协调的讨价还价策略。研究发现,随着生产环境成本和垃圾处理成本的增加,制造商更愿意设计具有高环境性能和低再制造能力的产品;再制造环境成本和使用环保成本的增加均会激励制造商设计具有高环境性能和高再制造能力的产品;而由客户承担的使用环保成本份额的高低不仅影响客户自身的利润,还会对制造商和零售商的利润产生影响;应用Nash讨价还价和Rubinstein轮流出价均能实现供应链协调,当各方谈判人员的讨价还价能力相当时,可选用Nash讨价还价的协调方式;当谈判人员的能力悬殊,且零售商和客户群的贴现率较高时,可选用Rubinstein轮流出价的协调方式。To research the bargaining coordination strategy of closed-loop supply chain, by considering the environmental performance and the remanufacturability of products at the same time, a closed-loop supply chain model with a manufacturer, a retailer and customers was established, and the equilibrium solution under centralized and decentralized decision-making model was respectively studied. The influence of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) policy parameters on environmental performance, remanufacturability and participants profits was examined. The Nash bargaining game model and Rubinstein bargaining game model were designed to realize supply chain coordination. The research showed that the manufacturers were more willing to design products with high environmental performance and low remanufacturability when the production environment cost and garbage disposal cost increase. The increase of remanufacturing environmental costs and environmental costs would encourage manufacturers to design products with high environmental performance and high remanufacturability. The share of environmental cost undertaken by customer not only affected the customer s own profits, but also affected the profits of manufacturer and retailer. The Nash bargaining model and Rubinstein bargaining model could both realize supply chain coordination in the bargaining model with coordinate supply chain. When the bargaining power of the parties involved in the negotiations was equal, the Nash bargaining model should be choosed to coordinate supply chain. If the bargaining power of the negotiators was very different and the discount rates of retailers and customers were higher, the Rubinstein bargaining model could be used to coordinate supply chain.

关 键 词：环境性能 再制造能力 闭环供应链 讨价还价 协调 责任延伸制度 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]