双层博弈视角下美国投资者-国家争端解决机制的演进  

The Evolution of the U.S. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism from the Perspective of Two-Level Games

作　　者：潘锐[1] 熊莉 Pan Rui;Xiong Li

机构地区：[1]复旦大学美国研究中心 [2]中国农业银行上海市分行

出　　处：《美国研究》2019年第3期26-42,M0003,共18页The Chinese Journal of American Studies

摘　　要：美国投资者-国家争端解决机制的演进,经历了借鉴国际通行解决方案、强调投资者权益、在投资者和国家之间寻求平衡这三个阶段。美国投资者-国家争端解决机制是经过国际和国内两个层面的主要行为体博弈而形成的,不仅在一定程度上受到谈判国的制约,更受到美国国内利益集团、国会议员和非政府组织的影响。美国投资者-国家争端解决机制赋予投资者大量权益,是美国国内法在海外投资领域的体现,是美国投资和贸易政策的重要组成部分,服务于美国的全球经济战略,并在无形中给予美国政府和企业政治和经济领域的主动权。其发展趋势表现为在投资者和国家间寻找某种平衡。The Investor-State Settlement Dispute Mechanism(ISDM)has undergone three different periods:from the elementary borrowing international established practice to President Clinton s drastic reformation favoring investors rights,then to Presidents Bush and Obama s gradual reform favoring the balance between investors and states.The domestic and international two-level game playing has made a huge impact upon the evolution of the U.S.ISDM.And the ISDM was not only influenced by foreign countries but also by lobbying of domestic interest groups,NGOs and congressmen.The ISDM,as a long-arm jurisdiction,gives American investors lots of rights and serves the global economic strategy of the U.S.There is no doubt that the United States will continue to adhere to the ISDM in the future,and will also to promote this mechanism to more countries.

关 键 词：美国经济 投资者-国家争端 解决机制双层博弈《华盛顿公约》 

分 类 号：F171.2[经济管理—世界经济]