意向性与人工智能:基于对“中文屋论证”的批判性考察  

Intentionality and Artificial Intelligence: The Critical Inspect Based on Chinese Room Argument

作　　者：孙会 Sun Hui(Science and Technology Institute of Philosophy, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210023 , China)

机构地区：[1]南京大学哲学系//南京大学科学技术哲学研究所

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2019年第10期200-205,共6页Science and Technology Management Research

摘　　要：塞尔通过他设计的"中文屋"思想实验对图灵的"智能"定义进行了反驳,认为计算机即使通过了图灵测试也不可能具有智能,人与计算机的根本区别在于意向性(自主意识),而意向性来源于人类大脑特有的生物结构--神经蛋白,这一点是计算机所不具有的。但是,塞尔并没有明确指出产生意向性的根源性力量究竟是什么,即人的大脑是如何具有意向性的,计算机究竟有无可能具有意向性,这是他的"中文屋"思想实验留给我们需要重新思考的问题,也是图灵测试需要我们认真审视的问题--智能的本质究竟是什么?在人工智能未来的发展中,人们对计算机智能的要求越来越高,如何让计算机具有像人类的大脑一样的意向性成为人工智能专家未来努力的方向,但同时计算机能否具有反思能力,进而改造自身系统也是专家们所担心的问题。Searle refuted Turing’s definition of "intelligence" through his "Chinese Room" thought experiment. He believes that even if the computer passes the Turing test, it is impossible to have intelligence. The fundamental difference between human and computer lies in intentionality(autonomous consciousness), and intentionality comes from the biological structure unique to the human brain-nerve protein, which is not available in computers. However, Searle did not clearly point out what the root cause of intentionality is, that is, how the human brain is intentional, and whether the computer may have intentionality. His "Chinese Room" thought experiment requires us to rethink, and it is also the question that Turing tests requires us to examine carefully – what is the nature of intelligence? In the future development of artificial intelligence, people are increasingly demanding computer intelligence. How to make computers have the same intention as the human brain becomes the direction of artificial intelligence experts in the future, but at the same time, whether computers can have reflective ability, and then transforming the system is also a concern for experts.

关 键 词：人工智能 中文屋论证 意向性 机器 

分 类 号：TP183[自动化与计算机技术—控制理论与控制工程]