我国央地政府间财政事权划分的理论分析  

A theoretical Analysis of the Division of Fiscal Power between the governments of Central China

作　　者：余亮 YU Liang(China Institute of Fiscal Sciences,Beijing 100036,China)

机构地区：[1]中国财政科学研究院

出　　处：《经济研究导刊》2019年第14期109-111,117,共4页Economic Research Guide

摘　　要：央地政府间财政事权划分是当前中国政府体制改革的核心内容之一。在研究政府职能的公共产品理论、研究政府决策行为的公共选择理论、研究财政分权制度的财政联邦主义理论基础上,总结出当前政府间财政事权划分的四个基本原则:按受益范围划分、激发政府积极性、财政事权与支出责任相匹配以及注重信息效率。由上述四个原则再推导出我国当前财政事权划分的基本框架。The division of financial powers between the governments of China is one of the core contents of the current reform of the Chinese government system.On the basis of studying the theory of public goods of government function,the theory of public choice of government decision-making behavior,and the theory of fiscal federalism of fiscal decentralization system,This paper summarizes four basic principles of the division of intergovernmental financial authority:according to the scope of benefit,stimulate the enthusiasm of the government,match the financial power with the expenditure responsibility,and pay attention to the information efficiency.From the above four principles,the basic framework of the division of financial power in China is deduced.

关 键 词：财政事权 公共产品理论 公共选择理论 财政联邦主义 

分 类 号：F810[经济管理—财政学]