VMCI下基于剩余产品成本分摊的生鲜农产品供应链协调  

Supply Chain Coordination of Fresh Agri-Product Based on Cost Allocation of Residual Products under VMCI

作　　者：冯颖[1] 吴茜[1] 张炎治[1] 余云龙[1] FENG Ying;WU Qian;ZHANG Yanzhi;YU Yunlong(School of Management,China University of Miningand Technology,Xuzhou 221116,Jiangsu,China)

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2019年第3期579-586,共8页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：中国矿业大学双一流建设“文化传承创新”重点专项资助项目(2018WHCC05)

摘　　要：研究由单生产商和单零售商构成的生鲜农产品供应链,其中,零售商作为主导者,负责产品的终端销售,生产商作为跟随者,负责产品的生产、运输任务以及剩余产品的处理。假设生鲜农产品市场需求受销售价格和产品新鲜度的双重影响,生产商管理零售商的库存且零售商按产品实际售出量支付货款,建立了VMCI模式下的两级Stackelberg博弈模型。研究表明:分散决策下生产商的最优库存因子低于集中决策下的取值,而参数满足特定条件下,零售价格和物流服务水平均大于集中决策下的相应值;由收入共享、物流服务成本共担和剩余产品成本分摊构成的契约组合可有效协调供应链系统。最后,通过数值模拟验证了上述契约组合的可行性。This paper studies a fresh agri-product supply chain with a single manufacturer and a single retailer. The retailer acts as a leader who is responsible for selling products, while the manufacturer, a follower, is responsible for producing, transporting products, and disposing of residual products. Assuming that the sale price and freshness influence the market demand, a two-stage Stackelberg game model has been established under the vendor managed consignment inventory(VMCI) environment when the manufacturer manages the retailer’s inventory while the retailer makes the payment according to the actual amount sold. The result shows that the optimal stocking factor in the decentralized mode is lower than the corresponding result in the centralized one while the optimal retailing price and logistics service level are higher than those in centralized mode under certain conditions. The contract combination, consisting of a revenue sharing contract, a logistics service cost sharing contract, and a residual products cost sharing contract, can efficiently coordinate the supply chain system. Further, the feasibility of the combination of the above contracts is verified by a numerical simulation.

关 键 词：生鲜农产品 供应商管理寄售库存 STACKELBERG博弈 协调机制 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]