群体性突发事件非利益相关者羊群行为的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysison Herding Behavior of Non-direct Stakeholders in Mass Emergencies

作　　者：徐浩[1] 谭德庆[1] 张敬钦 韩威[1] Xu Hao;Tan Deqing;Zhang Jingqin;Han Wei(School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031)

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,成都610031

出　　处：《管理评论》2019年第5期254-266,共13页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71571149);四川省软科学研究计划项目(2018ZR0333)

摘　　要：群体性突发事件作为危害政治稳定、社会安定的热点问题,是我国各级政府面临的巨大挑战,正确分析事件参与者的心理特征和行为机理,对预防和及时处置此类事件具有重要的意义。针对群体性突发事件中的羊群行为,考虑了非直接利益相关者参与群体性突发事件的心理效用、参与成本、未参与时的个人形象损失、"闹事有利"的侥幸心理、"不闹吃亏"带来的机会损失以及法不责众的心理等特征,建立非直接利益相关者参与群体性突发事件的演化博弈模型,并在此基础上引入政府干预,分析羊群行为的演化机理及影响因素。研究结论表明,非直接利益相关者参与群体性事件的羊群行为取决于一系列非常复杂的影响因素,多重均衡演化的数值分析显示,非直接利益相关者参与事件的比例和演化趋势与参与成本、侥幸心理、机会损失、政府干预等影响因素存在明显的相关性,最后根据数值分析给出相关建议,为分析群体性突发事件中参与者的心理和羊群行为特征提供理论支持。As a hot issue that threatens political and social stability,mass emergencies are the important challenges faced by governments at all levels in China. It’s important to analyze the psychological characteristics and behavioral mechanism of participants correctly,which has great significance to prevention and timely disposal of mass emergencies. For herding behavior in mass emergencies,this paper establishes an evolutionary game model of non-direct stakeholders who participate in mass emergencies to analyze the formation mechanism and influencing factors of herding behavior by considering the psychological effects of non-direct stakeholders,the cost of participation,the loss of personal image when not involved,the chances of"making trouble",the loss of opportunity when not involved and the fluke mind that the law is not responsible for the public,and on this basis,we introduce the government intervention to analyze the evolution mechanism and influencing factors of herd behavior. The results show that the herd behavior of non-direct stakeholders is affected by a series of very complex influencing factors,the numerical analysis of multi-equilibrium evolution shows that the proportion and evolution have an obvious correlation with participation cost,fluke mind,the loss of opportunity,government intervention,and so on. At the end of paper,some suggestions are given according to the numerical analysis,which provide a theoretical support for analyzing the psychological and herding behavior of the participants in the mass emergencies.

关 键 词：群体性突发事件 羊群行为 非直接利益相关者 演化博弈 群体心理 政府干预 

分 类 号：D631.43[政治法律—政治学]