政府对碳市场监管的三方演化博弈研究——基于罗尔斯主义社会福利函数视角  被引量:8

A tripartite evolutionary game research on government regulation of carbon market——Based on the perspective of Rawlsian social welfare function

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作  者:吕靖烨[1] 杨华 LYU Jingye;Yang Hua(School of Management, Xi'an University of Science and Technology, Xi'an 710054,China)

机构地区:[1]西安科技大学管理学院,陕西西安710054

出  处:《煤炭经济研究》2019年第3期77-82,共6页Coal Economic Research

基  金:陕西省教育科学项目(SGH17H099);陕西省软科学项目(2015KRM085)

摘  要:随着生态环境问题的日益严峻,2017年我国全面启动碳排放交易市场,第三方监管机构已成为政府对碳市场监管的重要工具,但也出现了与企业合谋进行违规排放等问题。为研究碳市场背景下,控排企业、第三方监管机构以及政府部门决策给社会福利带来的影响,建立起三方演化博弈模型,通过复制动态方程以及雅克比矩阵确定出演化稳定均衡策略,从而在罗尔斯主义社会福利函数的理论基础上,得出具体的社会福利函数。通过研究发现,对企业及监管机构违规操作的罚金、企业行贿成本、企业违规排放的额外经济收益以及对环境的损害、政府复查成本等是影响演化稳定均衡策略以及社会福利函数的主要因素。在现有技术水平下,社会福利函数无法确定确切的最大值。在此基础上,为控制企业排放量,增加居民幸福感,从以上几个方面提出相关建议。With the increasingly serious ecological and environmental problems, China launched a carbon emission trading market in 2017. Third-party regulatory agencies have become an important tool for the government to regulate the carbon market. However, there have also been problems with collusion with enterprises to carry out illegal emissions. In order to study the impact of decision-making enterprises, third-party regulators and government departments on social welfare in the context of carbon market, a three-party evolutionary game model was established, and the evolutionary stable equilibrium strategy was determined by replicating the dynamic equations and the Jacobian matrix. Based on the theory of the Rawlsian social welfare function ,a concrete social welfare function was obtained. Through research, it was found that the fines for corporate and regulatory violations, the cost of corporate bribery, the additional economic benefits of corporate emissions, the damage to the environment ,and the cost of government review were the main factors affecting the evolutionary equilibrium strategy and the social welfare function. In addition, it was found that under the current technological level, the social welfare function cannot determine the exact maximum. On this basis, in order to control corporate emissions, increase residents' sense of well-being, relevant suggestions were put forward from the above aspects.

关 键 词:碳市场 演化博弈 复制动态方程 社会福利函数 政府监管 

分 类 号:F224[经济管理—国民经济]

 

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