财政分权、晋升激励与房价  

Fiscal Decentralization,Promotion Incentive and Housing Price

作　　者：聂利君[1] 都佳璐 徐春发 Nie Lijun;Du Jialu;Xu Chunfa(School of Finance,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 102206,China;College of Management and Economics,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China)

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学金融学院,北京102206 [2]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《当代经济管理》2019年第7期24-30,共7页Contemporary Economic Management

摘　　要：将财政分权、晋升激励及房价纳入同一逻辑框架,为政府频繁调控、房价却持续高涨的异象提供了更充分的证据。通过使用2005~2016年我国31个省份的年度面板数据,发现财政分权对房价有显著的正向作用,而且这种促进作用在三大经济区域间和各省份间均存在显著的差异。研究还发现政治晋升激励会显著扩大财政分权对房价的正向影响。This paper incorporates fiscal decentralization,promotion incentive and housing price into the same logical framework,which provides sufficient evidence for the fluctuation of housing price in China. Using the annual panel data of 31 provinces in China from 2005 to 2016 ,this paper finds that fiscal decentralization has a significant positive effect on housing price ,and this effect varies among the three major economic regions and different provinces. This paper also finds that political promotion incentive has a significant positive effect to increase the impact of fiscal decentralization on housing price.

关 键 词：中国式财政分权 政府目标管理 晋升激励 房价 

分 类 号：F81[经济管理—财政学]