激励悖论对串通投标规制的启示  

Enlightenment of Incentive Paradox on Collusion Bid Regulation

作　　者：吴安青 王延吉 WU Anqing;WANG Yanji(Campus Planning and Construction and Asset Management Office,Beihang university,Beijing 100191,China)

机构地区：[1]北京航空航天大学校园规划建设与资产管理处

出　　处：《实验室研究与探索》2019年第6期260-264,共5页Research and Exploration In Laboratory

摘　　要：串通投标是招标投标领域的顽症,严重危害了市场竞争秩序,造成恶劣的社会影响。根据机制设计理论,在明确社会治理目标之后,构建能表达主要参与方核心策略的博弈模型是机制设计的前提。通常来说,在招标投标活动中,招标人占据主导地位,国内学者常用的囚徒困境模型仅能研究投标人之间的合作与对抗,不能反映出招标人与投标人之间的博弈。提出激励悖论是揭示串通投标运作机理的有效博弈模型。基于该模型,可知加重处罚违规的投标人,只能在短期降低投标人串通投标的概率,而加重处罚失职的招标人可以实现持续有效地降低投标人串通投标概率的治理目标。Collusion bidding is a chronic problem in the field of tendering and bidding,it seriously jeopardizes the order of market competition and causes bad social influence. According to the mechanism design theory,the establishment of a game model that can express the core strategies of the main participants is the premise of the mechanism design after clarifying the objectives of social governance. Generally speaking,in the tendering and bidding activities,the tenderer occupies a dominant position. The prisoner’s dilemma model commonly used by domestic scholars can only study the cooperation and confrontation between bidders,and cannot reflect the game between the tenderer and the bidder. This paper proposes that intensive paradox is an effective game model to reveal the operating mechanism of collusion bidding. Based on this model,it can be seen that heavy penalties for violating bidders can only reduce the bidder’s probability of collusive bids in the short term,while heavier penalties for dereliction bidders can continue to effectively reduce the bidder’s probability of colluding bids.

关 键 词：招标 投标 博弈论 囚徒困境 激励悖论 串通投标 

分 类 号：F284[经济管理—国民经济]