水库群系统发电调度的合作博弈研究  

Study in cooperative game theory for operation of multi-reservoir system

作　　者：徐雨妮 付湘[1,2] XU Yuni;FU Xiang(State Key Laboratory of Water Resource and Hydropower Engineering Science, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China;Hubei Provincial Collaborative Innovation Center for Water Resources Security, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学水资源与水电工程国家重点实验室,湖北武汉430072 [2]武汉大学水资源安全保障湖北省协同创新中心,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《人民长江》2019年第6期211-218,共8页Yangtze River

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(91647204)

摘　　要：水资源的竞争性和非排他性导致水库管理者基于个体利益进行发电调度,使得水库在满足个体利益的同时往往忽略了系统的整体效益。为了在保证个体利益的基础上实现系统总效益的最大化,建立了梯级水库群发电调度合作博弈模型;采用改进后的水循环算法对模型进行分层求解。以金沙江两库与三峡梯级构成的梯级水库群为研究对象,选取典型年进行实例计算。计算结果表明:梯级水库群发电调度的合作博弈模型在获得系统最大效益的同时使得个体利益达到Pareto最优状态,实现水库群总效益和单库个体效益的双赢,既优于联合优化调度模型又优于单库优化调度模型。该合作博弈模型及其新解法可为水库群调度决策分析开创一种新思路。Due to the characteristic of competition and non-excludability of water resources, reservoir operators usually make decisions based on their individual interests, which often ignores the system’s overall benefits. In order to maximize the system’s overall benefits on the basis of ensuring their individual interests, the paper built a hydropower model for the multi-reservoir system based on the cooperative game theory and solved the proposed model by the improved water cycle algorithm. A multi-reservoir system, consisting of two reservoirs on Jinsha River and the Three Gorges cascade, is used as a case. Results from the proposed model under typical years showed that the multi-reservoir system can obtain a maximized overall benefits and the reservoir individual benefits can achieve a Pareto-optimality, resulting in a win-win situation of the individual and system’s benefits. This model is better than the joint optimal operation model for the multi-reservoir system and the optimal operation model for the single reservoir that can provide a new idea for decision analyses of the multi-reservoir operation.

关 键 词：梯级水库群 发电调度 合作博弈 水循环算法 效益分配 

分 类 号：TV697[水利工程—水利水电工程]