博弈论视角下的碳交易价格对治理雾霾的影响  

作　　者：杨昆[1] 

机构地区：[1]山西省科学技术情报研究所

出　　处：《科技创新导报》2019年第8期244-247,共4页Science and Technology Innovation Herald

摘　　要：在政府与企业间进行智猪博弈时,纳什均衡为政府主持碳交易时,企业参与碳交易;完全但不完美动态博弈条件下的政府与企业博弈时,最优纳什均衡是当罚金处于碳交易的高定价与低定价的均值附近时,企业才会参加碳交易;提出了碳交易时出现的问题及解决问题的路径,包括罚金定额最优化的路径、解决政企冲突的路径、砸烂政企共同利益的路径、降低企业碳交易成本的路径、扩大企业的边际减排成本差距的路径。When the pigs game theory between government and enterprises,and when the Nash equilibrium for the government to host the transaction,companies involved in carbon trading;When the game between government and enterprises under not completely perfect dynamic game theory,the optimal Nash equilibrium is that companies involved in carbon trading when the penalty is near the mean of the high and low pricing of the carbon trading;This paper presents carbon trading problems and the paths of solving problems when carbon trading,which including the path of optimizing the fines,the path of solving the conflicts between government and enterprises,the path of smashing the common interests of government and enterprises and the path of expanding the enterprise's marginal cost reduction gap.

关 键 词：碳交易价格 智猪博弈 完全但不完美动态A博弈 罚金 雾霾 

分 类 号：F06[经济管理—政治经济学]