媒体报道抑制管理层审计意见购买行为吗?——基于信息效应与治理效应的实证检验  

Does Media Coverage Inhibit Managerial Audit Opinion-shopping? Empirical Research on Information Effect and Governance Effect

作　　者：张俊民 宋婕 ZHANG Jun-min;SONG Jie

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学会计学院

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2019年第7期64-78,共15页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“产权视角下的审计师声誉机制及其经济后果研究”(项目编号:71272189);教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目“高管股权激励、媒体报道与企业投资迎合行为研究”(项目编号:14YJC630048);天津财经大学研究生科研资助计划“媒体曝光、分析师跟踪与管理者审计意见购买行为研究”(项目编号:2017TCB08)

摘　　要：本文从媒体这一非正式制度出发,实证考察媒体报道对管理层审计意见购买行为的影响。利用2007-2014 年中国 A 股市场数据研究发现:上市公司存在明显的审计意见购买行为,而媒体报道能有效抑制这一行为。并且,这一抑制作用仅存在于信息不对称程度较高和深陷代理问题的公司,以及签字会计师审计任期较短、聘请不具行业专长和小规模事务所的公司。研究还发现,媒体报道的抑制作用在盈余管理程度较高的公司占主导,且负面报道相比非负面报道的抑制作用更强。这些结论表明,媒体在抑制我国资本市场审计意见购买机会主义行为中发挥了重要的信息效应与治理效应,研究对加强审计意见购买监管与媒体治理具有重要的现实参考意义。From media as an informal institution, this paper empirically examines the impact of media coverage on managerial audit opinion shopping. Using a data from Chinese A share market from 2007 to 2014, this paper finds that listed companies successfully engage in opinion shopping in China, but media coverage significantly inhibits it. Further, the findings only remain for firms with higher level of information asymmetry and agency costs, also for firms whose auditors with shorter tenure of auditing and for firms which employ audit firms without industry expertise or with smaller size. Moreover, the role of media is largely pre dominated in firms with higher level of earnings management, and negative coverage has stronger effect on opinion shopping than non negative coverage does. In conclusion, the paper indicates that media plays infor mation effect and governance effect in inhibiting managerial opinion shopping, and provides great practical significance to strengthen the supervision of the opinion shopping and media governance.

关 键 词：媒体报道 审计意见购买 信息不对称 代理成本 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]