基于量子博弈的产学研协同创新激励机制研究  

Research on the incentive mechanism of the industry-university-institute collaborative innovation based on the quantum game theory

作　　者：贺一堂 谢富纪[1] HE Yitang;XIE Fuji(Antai College of Economics and Management,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200030,China)

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2019年第6期1435-1448,共14页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(13AZD015);教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(15JZD017);国家自然科学基金(71373158)~~

摘　　要：本文引入了量子博弈的分析范式来研究产学研协同创新的激励机制,构建了产学研协同创新的量子博弈模型.对是否考虑纠缠态的情形做了比较研究,结果表明,考虑了纠缠态后,努力的一方不必再承担对方“背叛”的风险,在一定程度上解决了经典博弈中的“囚徒困境”问题.在产学研协同创新的情境下,协同双方需要在协同开始前商榷并委托第三方确定可被观测到的、易于量化的相关绩效指标,并签订“纠缠合同”,确保协同双方均没有动机去采取非量子策略,这时采用最大努力程度的完全量子策略对协同双方来说均是最优的.This paper employs the quantum game paradigm to study the incentive mechanism of the industry-university-institute(IUI for short)collaborative innovation,and construct the IUI collaborative innovation model.The result indicates that the quantum game analysis shows great advantage over the classical game model,and implies that considering entanglement of states,the hardworking side will not take the risk of the other side's betrayal,which resolves the"Prisoners'Dilemma"in the classical game theory to some degree.In the IUI collaboration case,both sides need to negotiate and delegate a third party to formulate some performance indicators,and they also need to sign an"entanglement contract"to ensure that neither of them has the motivation to deviate from the quantum strategy.Thus,the quantum strategy with maximal effort is the most profitable.

关 键 词：产学研协同创新 量子博弈 激励机制 合同理论 量子纠缠 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]