美国工会建会中的劳资博弈  

Labor-captial Game through Trade Union Organization in United States

作　　者：史庆 SHI Qing(Shanghai River Delta Law Firm,Shanghai 200120)

机构地区：[1]上海江三角律师事务所

出　　处：《工会理论研究》2019年第4期58-64,共7页Labour Union Studies

摘　　要：2017年福耀玻璃与美国联合汽车工会一案反映了美国工会建会制度的独特逻辑。1935年,《全国劳工关系法》赋予全国劳资关系委员会调整全国劳动关系的权力。具体在工会建会方面,除雇主自愿认可外,一个工会须经过民主选举、获得多数选票才能取得企业雇员的代表权。工会首先需要获得不少于30%雇员的授权卡,其次需要向全国劳资关系委员会递交“RC”申请,在委员会的协调下与雇主确认选举。在竞选期间,工会如认为可能失败可以策略性地撤回申请、提起不当劳动行为指控或继续竞选。竞选后,工会与企业均可以提出异议。工会获得成功的关键在于获得足够多的授权卡以及超过半数的适格投票人在选举日投出赞成票。The case of Fuyao Glass America and United Automobile Workers in 2017 reflects the unique logic of the union organization system in the United States. In 1935, the National Labor Relations Act authorized the National Labor Relations Board to regulate labor relations nationwide. In terms of union organization, in addition to voluntary recognition by employers, a trade union must be democratically elected and obtain a majority of votes before it can obtain the right to represent its employees. Unions first need to obtain authorization cards from no less than 30 percent of their employees, and second need to submit an RC application to the National Labor Relations Board, which coordinates with employers to confirm elections. During the election campaign, unions may strategically withdraw their applications, file unfair labor practices charges or continue to campaign if they think they may lose. After the election, both unions and employers can raise objections. The key to the union’s success is getting enough authorization cards and more than half of eligible voters to vote yes on election day.

关 键 词：全国劳工关系法 全国劳资关系委员会 工会建会 选举 劳资博弈 

分 类 号：D971.225[政治法律—法学]