基于博弈分析的LED专利池专利许可费率确定机制研究  

Research on the Determination Mechanism of Patent License Fee of LED Patent Pool Based on Game Analysis

作　　者：胡海容[1] 陈婷 Hu Hairong;Chen Ting(Chongqing Intellectual Property School,Chongqing University of Technology,Chongqing 400054)

机构地区：[1]重庆理工大学重庆知识产权学院

出　　处：《情报探索》2019年第7期1-6,共6页Information Research

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目“知识产权侵权惩罚性赔偿国际比较研究”(项目编号:13CFX088)中期成果

摘　　要：[目的/意义]旨在为专利池专利许可费率研究提供参考。[方法/过程]以LED产业为对象,基于博弈模型研究专利许可费率对专利权人入池意愿的影响。[结果/结论]纯授权人的入池意愿与专利池专利许可费率呈正相关关系,许可费率越高,纯授权人的入池意愿越强烈;纵向综合制造商的入池意愿与专利池专利许可费率相关度不高,但纵向综合制造商的存在有利于降低专利池专利许可费率。[Purpose/significance]The paper is to provide references for the study on patent license fee of patent pool.[Method/process]The paper takes the LED industry as the research object,and studies the influence of patent license fee on the patentee’s willingness to enter the pool based on the game model.[Result/conclusion]Pure licensor’s willingness to enter the pool is positively related to the patent license fee of patent pool,the higher the license fee,the stronger pure licensor’s willingness to enter the pool;vertical integrated manufacturer’s willingness to enter the pool is not highly correlated to the patent pool license fee,but the existence of vertical integrated manufacturer is conducive to reducing the patent pool license fee.

关 键 词：LED产业 专利池 专利许可费率 博弈分析 

分 类 号：G306[文化科学]