混合所有制下企业的过度进入与公共政策控制研究  

Research of Excess Entry Under Mixed Ownership and Public Policy Control

作　　者：张伟[1] 于良春[1] ZHANG Wei;YU Liangchun(Shandong University,Jinan 250100)

机构地区：[1]山东大学经济学院

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2019年第7期46-60,共15页Research on Economics and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“混合所有制企业研发支持的公共政策选择研究”(71773066);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“开放经济下中国反垄断政策的执行标准及国际协调机制研究”(17YJA790095);山东省社会科学规划研究项目“开放经济下企业横向合并的反垄断政策设计与实施研究”(16CJJJ06)

摘　　要：本文在混合所有制框架内考察纵向约束情形下最终产品市场中的企业过度进入问题。研究发现企业的产权结构以及产品的差异化程度同时对企业的过度进入存在影响,当下游企业产品的差异化程度较高时,过度进入将随上游企业混合所有制改革的推进而得以缓和或消失。导致社会总福利下降的过度进入将使政府倾向于使用公共政策对市场进入予以控制,本文选择从量税作为政策工具研究政策设计对过度进入的影响,发现对上游混合所有制企业征税在抑制过度进入方面的效果更为明显。This paper studied excess entry problems in the final product market with the vertical restrains under the framework of mixed ownership.It is found that both the degree of ownership of the enterprise and the degree of differentiation of the product affect the excess entry of the enterprise.Only when the degree of differentiation of the products of the downstream enterprises is high,the excess entry will be alleviated or even disappeared with the advancement of the mixed ownership reform of the upstream enterprises.In addition,this paper also analyzed excess entry in two cases,namely state-owned property right entering downstream and non-state-owned property entering upstream.The results show that the above both cases two ease the degree of excess entry.The excess entry stimulates the government to use public policy control.This paper chooses tax from quantity as the policy tool to study the impact of policy design on excess entry,showing that the effect of taxation on the upstream is more obvious.

关 键 词：混合所有制 产权结构 过度进入 公共政策控制 从量税 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]