旅游生态环境保护模式选择的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Tourism Ecological Environment Protection Mode Choice

作　　者：张燕华[1] 王娜[1] 周章金[1] ZHANG Yan-hua;WANG Na;ZHOU Zhang-jin(School of Information Engineering,Xizang Minzu University,Xianyang 712000,China)

机构地区：[1]西藏民族大学信息工程学院

出　　处：《价值工程》2019年第21期117-120,共4页Value Engineering

基　　金：西藏自治区科技厅项目(2016-ZR-15-21);西藏科技厅软科学项目(RK20170011)

摘　　要：旅游业运作模式的选择是影响旅游生态环境的重要因素,基于地方政府和旅游企业的博弈关系,构建演化博弈模型,从动态角度探讨博弈双方的演化稳定策略;仿真实验结果表明:演化稳定策略主要取决于博弈双方的初始状态及其演化路径;最后,分别从不同角度提出相关政策建议。The choice of tourism operation mode is an important factor affecting the tourism ecological environment. Based on the game relationship between local government and tourism enterprises, the evolutionary game model is constructed, and the evolutionary stability strategies of both sides of the game are discussed from the dynamic perspective. The simulation experiment results show that the evolutionary stability strategy mainly depends on the initial state of both sides of the game and its evolutionary path;finally, the relevant policy recommendations are proposed from different angles.

关 键 词：低碳旅游 地方政府 生态环境 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F592.7[经济管理—旅游管理] F224.32[经济管理—产业经济]