“水稻供应商+水稻加工企业”的优质稻米供给决策研究  

Study on Supply Decision of High Quality Rice for "Rice Supplier + Rice Processing Enterprise"

作　　者：高艳[1] 张宏宇 GAO Yan;ZHANG Hong-yu(College of Economics & Management,Heilongjiang Bayi Agricultural university,Daqing 163319,China)

机构地区：[1]黑龙江八一农垦大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2019年第13期299-307,共9页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：校博士启动金课题《主产区粮食产后服务主体收储现状调查与发展对策研究》(XDB-2017-07);黑龙江省农垦总局攻关软科学项目《黑龙江垦区粮食供应链安全和重要农产品有效供给研究》(HNK125B-14-08)

摘　　要：水稻供应商与水稻加工企业是供应链中决定水稻质量的重要环节,为了满足消费者对需求质量的要求,保障市场需求供给.在理性经济人等多重假设基础上,构建与求解无限期Rubinstein轮流出价的讨价还价博弈模型,对水稻供应商和水稻加工企业未来创造得到的共同利益分配问题进行讨论,通过破裂点判断水稻加工企业的机会主义支付,得到水稻供应商与水稻加工企业利益分配的均衡契约.并根据上述结果分析"水稻供应商+水稻加工企业"构成的二级供应链在利益驱使下如何进行优质稻米供给决策.Rice suppliers and rice processing enterprises are important links in the supply chain to det ermine the quality of rice,in order to meet consumer demand for quality,to ensure market demand and supply.On the basis of multiple hypotheses,such as rational economic man,this paper constructs and solves the bargaining game model of infinite Rubinstein rotation bidding,discusses the common benefit distribution problem created by rice suppliers and rice processing enterprises in the future,and judges the rice processing enterprises through the break point.Opportunistic payment,a balanced contract for the distribution of benefits between rice suppliers and rice processing companies.Based on the above results,this paper analyzes how the second-level supply chain of"rice supplier rice processing enterprise"makes decisions on quality rice supply driven by interests.

关 键 词：水稻供应商 水稻加工企业 优质稻米 讨价还价博弈模型 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]