上市公司股权再融资监管的理论分析与策略选择  

Theoretical Analysis and Strategic Choice of Equity Refinancing Supervision of Listed Companies

作　　者：任晓聪[1] 王慧[2] REN Xiao-cong;WANG Hui(School of Economics,Liaoning University,Shenyang 110036,China;School of Tourism and Hospitality Management,Shenyang Normal University,Shenyang 110034,China)

机构地区：[1]辽宁大学经济学院,辽宁沈阳110036 [2]辽宁大学经济学院(沈阳师范大学旅游管理学院),辽宁沈阳110036

出　　处：《经济体制改革》2019年第4期123-128,共6页Reform of Economic System

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“振兴东北老工业基地重大体制机制问题及对策研究”(17ZDA060)

摘　　要：上市公司股权再融资是证券市场融资体系的重要组成部分,是通过发行股权类证券在证券市场进行融资的行为,不仅有助于市场资源的优化配置,也能助力我国经济转型升级。但证券市场中的信息非对称、我国金融领域法律的不完善等问题,倒逼政府加强对上市公司股权再融资的监管。本文基于双重差分模型,通过对2000-2017年我国股权再融资监管进行实证分析,发现流通股比率越高,投资人收益越低,即当前我国股权再融资手段较为单一且效率不高。因此,需拓展监管主体,提升监管效率,完善上市公司再融资监管机制。Equity refinancing of listed companies is an important part of the financing system in the securities market. It is the financing behavior in the securities market through issuing equity securities. It not only helps to optimize the allocation of market resources, but also provides a boost for China's economic transformation and upgrading. However, the information asymmetry in the securities market and the imperfection of China's financial laws force the government to strengthen the supervision of the equity refinancing of listed companies. Based on the dual difference model, this paper makes an empirical analysis of China's equity refinancing regulation from 2000 to 2017 and finds that the higher the ratio of outstanding shares, the lower the return of investors. That is to say, China's equity refinancing means are relatively simple and inefficient. Therefore, it is necessary to expand the regulatory bodies and improve the regulatory efficiency. At the same time, the refinancing regulatory mechanism of listed companies should be improved to better the measures for the equity refinancing regulation of listed companies.

关 键 词：股权再融资 监管机制 市场业绩 策略选择 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]