双重条件的干预主义与心智因果  

Dual-condition Conception of Interventionism and Mental Causation

作　　者：裘江杰[1] QIU Jiangjie(School of Philosophy, Renmin University of China, Beijing, 100872)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2019年第8期24-31,共8页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：中国人民大学2019年度“中央高校建设世界一流大学(学科)和特色发展引导专项资金”

摘　　要：在非还原的物理主义框架下,心智事物是否有独立的因果效力是当代心智哲学研究中的一个基本问题;最近钟磊发表论文指出,基于一种双重条件的干预主义的因果理论,可以论证心智事物是具有独立的因果效力的;随后叶峰发文商榷,对钟磊的论证提出了几方面的质疑;本文重构了钟磊的双重条件的干预主义理论,并回应了叶峰的相应疑问,同时提出,钟磊的心智事物具有独立因果效力的这一论断应该被替换为一个限定性的版本。In the framework of nonreductive physicalism, whether mental events have independent causal powers is a basic problem of philosophy of mind. In the recent papers, based on a causation theory, the dualcondition conception of interventionism, Zhong Lei argues that we have a positive answer to the previous problem;then Ye Feng raises a few objections to Zhong Lei’s demonstration. In this paper, I will rebuild Zhong Lei’s dual-condition conception of interventionism and respond some of Ye Feng’s criticism. I will also argue that Zhong Lei’s proposal should be replaced by a restrictive version.

关 键 词：心智因果性 干预主义 非还原的物理主义 

分 类 号：N0[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]