面向企业绿色创新的政府R&D补贴契约设计  

Design of Government Research and Development Subsidy Contract for Enterprise Green Innovation

作　　者：陈永泰 徐晗玉[3] 徐峰 盛昭瀚[2] CHEN Yongtai;XU Hanyu;XU Feng;SHENG Zhaohan(School of Engineering Management and Auditing,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815,China;School of Management and Engineering,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210023,China;School of Management,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,Jiangsu,China)

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学工程管理与审计学院,南京211815 [2]南京大学工程管理学院,南京210023 [3]江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2019年第4期717-724,共8页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71471077);国家自然科学基金重大研究计划培育项目(91646123);教育部人文社会科学研究项目青年基金资助项目(15YJCZH135);镇江市重点研发计划社会发展面上项目(SH2017062)

摘　　要：企业的逆向选择行为极大地削弱了政府R&D补贴的效率,因此,合理设计政府R&D补贴激励契约显得尤为重要.运用委托代理理论,基于Kuhn-Tucker条件研究了政府如何设计面向企业绿色创新的R&D补贴激励契约.研究表明:在无监督情境下,政府应允许高技术企业获取信息租金,但这将扭曲低技术企业的绿色创新;政府将通过对高技术类型企业实施高补贴,以及对低技术类型企业的降低补贴以激励高技术类型的企业承担更多的绿色创新责任.有监督情境下,严格的监督和适当的罚金对政府R&D补贴效率的提升具有严格的正向意义.针对企业的异质性绿色创新能力,政府应灵活和多样化地设计R&D补贴.The reverse selection behavior of enterprises can greatly weaken the efficiency of government research and development subsidy. Therefore, it is particularly important to design a reasonable incentive contract for government research and development subsidy. This paper studied the designs of government research and development subsidy incentive contract for enterprise green innovation, based on the principal-agent theory and the Kuhn-Tucker condition. The study shows that under the unsupervised situation, the government should allow high-tech enterprises to obtain information rents, but this will distort the green innovation of low-tech enterprises. The government will implement high subsidies for high-tech companies but lower subsidies for low-tech companies to motivate high-tech companies to shoulder more green innovation responsibilities. In the case of supervision, strict supervision and appropriate fines have a strict positive significance for the promotion of research and development subsidy efficiency. In view of the heterogeneous green innovation capability of enterprises, the government should be flexible and diversified in designing research and development subsidies.

关 键 词：研发补贴 逆向选择 绿色创新 监督能力 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]