水利工程建立最优风险分担与激励契约分析  

Analysis on Establishing Optimal Risk Sharing and Incentive Contract in Water Conservancy Project

作　　者：吉祖湛 JI Zu-zhan(Jiangsu Provincial Engineering Survey Research Institute LLC,Yangzhou 225002, China)

机构地区：[1]江苏省工程勘测研究院有限责任公司

出　　处：《黑龙江水利科技》2019年第7期197-201,共5页Heilongjiang Hydraulic Science and Technology

摘　　要：为确保水利工程施工水平引入水利工程监理,公平心理偏好和信用偏好作为多任务水利工程监理的特性,在制衡水利工程监理与水利工程业主之间的利益关系,约束水利工程监理职业道德,激发创造效益积极性等方面起到重要作用。文章基于公平心理偏好和信用偏好探讨如何对多任务水利工程监理模式建立最优风险分担与激励契约。研究表明:水利工程收益与水利工程监理公平薪酬在一定范围内负相关,为提高收益可适当减少公平薪酬,但是超出一定范围则会对心理偏好造成负面影响导致水利工程收益减少,当多任务水利工程监理存在互补关系成本函数时,风险分担与公平心理偏好正相关。In order to ensure the construction level of water conservancy project,the hydraulic project supervision is introduced,as the characteristics of multi-tasks water conservancy project supervision,fairness preference and credit preference can balance the benefit relation between water conservancy project supervisors and owners,limiting the professional ethics of water conservancy project supervision,which can work up the enthusiasm to create the benefits. Based on fairness preference and credit preference,this paper is to discuss how to establish the optimal risk sharing and incentive contract for multi-task water conservancy project supervision model. The study shows that: the income of water conservancy project is negatively correlated with the fair salary of water conservancy project supervision in a certain range,the fair salary may be reduced correctly in order to increase the benefits,but there will cause negative impact on mental preference if exceeding a certain range,leading to the benefit reduction of water conservancy project;the risk sharing is positively correlated with fairness mental preference when there exists complementary relation cost function in the multi-task water conservancy project supervision.

关 键 词：水利工程 公平心理偏好 风险分担 激励契约 

分 类 号：TV512[水利工程—水利水电工程]