农村居民点整治中利益相关者博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Different Stakeholders in Rural Residential Land Consolidation

作　　者：李佩恩 陈怡君 刘小波[1] 匡垚瑶 Li Peien;Chen Yijun;Liu Xiaobo;Kuang Yaoyao(Chongqing Liangjiang New District Real Estate Development Co.,Ltd.,Chongqing,401147,China)

机构地区：[1]内江师范学院,四川内江641199 [2]重庆两江新区置业发展有限公司,重庆401147

出　　处：《绿色科技》2019年第14期287-290,290,共4页Journal of Green Science and Technology

基　　金：内江师范学院2017年度校级科研项目(编号:17JC24);专业转型发展改革试点—土木工程(编号:川教改办[2015]2号[1])

摘　　要：在界定利益相关者的基础上,阐述了农村居民点整治过程中各利益主体的行为偏好,运用博弈矩形,分析利益主体在整治中的博弈行为,探寻了影响各利益主体博弈的相关因素。研究结果表明:完善中央政府对地方政府的经济考核指标,加大对地方政府的惩罚力度,能够有效抑制地方政府的违法整治行为;提高农民的整治补偿收益,建立健全公众参与机制,能增加农民对整治工作的支持力度。Based on the stakeholder theory,the paper elaborates the behavior preference of stakeholders in rural residential land consolidation process.Using the game rectangle,this paper analyzes the game behavior of interest subjects in remediation and explores the relevant factors that affect the game of various stakeholders.Research shows that:it can effectively restrain the illegal behavior of local government by completing economic assessment indicators of the central government to local government and increasing the punishment of local government.2.it can increase farmers'supports for the rectification work by improving the remediation compensation income of farmers,setting up and perfecting public participation mechanism.

关 键 词：农村居民点整治 利益相关者 行为偏好 博弈矩形 博弈分析 

分 类 号：TP79[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]