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作 者:董坤 解本政[1] 张琳[1] 李萍 刘娜 DONG Kun;XIE Ben-zheng;ZHANG Lin;LI Ping;LIU Na(School of Management Engineering, Shandong Jianzhu University, Jinan 250101, China;School of Economics and Management, Jilin Architecture and Civil Engineering Institute, Changcun 130021, China)
机构地区:[1]山东建筑大学管理工程学院,山东济南250101 [2]吉林建筑大学经济与管理学院,吉林长春130021
出 处:《工程管理学报》2019年第3期75-80,共6页Journal of Engineering Management
基 金:国家级大学生创新创业训练计划项目(201710430056);山东省社会科学规划研究项目(17CGLJ12);山东省高校人文社会科学研究计划项目(J17RB092)
摘 要:PPP项目中,缔约阶段风险合理分担是影响项目成功的关键因素。为更好地解决缔约阶段风险分担不合理的问题,对PPP项目风险分担原则和方法进行分析,考虑到该阶段政府和私人部门在地位、信息获取程度的不对称性,构建了双方不完全信息视角下的讨价还价博弈模型。并分析得出缔约阶段风险分担比例与双方地位强弱程度、掌握信息程度、成本损耗系数和采取威慑策略概率有关这一结论,为改善这种状况提出了建议。In the PPP projects,the risk sharing in the contracting phase is a key factor affecting the success of the project. In order to better solve the problem of unreasonable risk sharing in the contracting stage,this paper firstly analyzes the risk sharing principles and methods of PPP projects. Secondly,considering the asymmetry of status and information acquisition degree between the government and the private sector in this stage,this study constructs a bargaining game model from the perspective of incomplete information between the two sides. Finally,the conclusion is drawn that the risk sharing ratio in the contracting stage is related to the status of both parties,the degree of information mastered,the cost loss coefficient and the probability of adopting deterrence strategy, At last, some suggestions are put forward to improve the situation.
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