激励悖论视角下河长制湖长制的河湖治理逻辑  

The logic of river and lake governance based on river chief system and lake chief system from the perspective of incentive paradox

作　　者：田贵良[1] 顾少卫 Tian Guiliang;Gu Shaowei

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院

出　　处：《中国水利》2019年第14期5-8,23,共5页China Water Resources

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目“跨境水资源确权与分配方法及保障体系研究”(17ZDA064);国家自然科学基金面上项目“基于粮食安全的虚拟水贸易对气候变化动态响应与调整”(41471456);中央科研业务费项目“面向生态水利的水资源现代治理制度耦合研究”(2019B19814)

摘　　要：基于河长制湖长制的运行机制,建立河长制湖长制的激励悖论博弈模型,分析了地方行政长官、行政部门与企业两两博弈的情况,并重点分析了行政部门与企业博弈双方的策略集以及策略选择,通过图形和数学计算得出混合策略纳什均衡,揭示地方政府针对河湖污染问题提出的激励措施存在悖论,即预期效果与实际效果不符的现象,进而提出了双重问责机制有助于河长制湖长制有效实施的逻辑。最后提供了一些政策建议,以期为河长制湖长制全面实施提供学理性基础,深入践行绿水青山就是金山银山的理念。Based on the operating mechanism of river chief system and lake chief system, an incentive paradox game model of river chief system and lake chief system was established to analyze the situation of the game between the local chief executive, the administrative department and the enterprise. The strategy set and tactics choice of both the administrative department and the enterprise are focused on. The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is obtained through graphic and mathematical calculations. There is a paradox that reveals the incentives proposed by local governments for the pollution of rivers and lakes, which is that the expected effect is inconsistent with the actual effect. Therefore, the double accountability mechanism is considered to be helpful to the effective implementation of river chief system and lake chief system. Finally, some policy suggestions is put forward to provide a certain theoretical basis for the full implementation of the river chief system and lake chief system, and to practice the conviction that lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets.

关 键 词：河长制 湖长制 河湖污染 激励悖论 混合策略 问责机制 

分 类 号：TV85[水利工程—水利水电工程] F224[经济管理—国民经济]