基于Rubinstein讨价还价博弈的农地流转价格研究  

Study on Price of Farmland Transfer Based on Rubinstein Bargaining Game

作　　者：张文妍[1] 李恩极 李群[3] ZHANG Wen-yan;LI En-ji;LI Qun(China Federation of Industrial Economics,Beijing 100191,China;Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 102488,China;Institute of Quantitative&Technical Economics,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 100732,China)

机构地区：[1]中国工业经济联合会,北京100191 [2]中国社会科学院研究生院,北京102488 [3]中国社会科学院数量经济与技术经济研究所,北京100732

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2019年第14期108-115,共8页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家社会科学基金“经济发展方式转变成效评价研究及其实证分析(11BTJ015)”;北京市科技专项(2161100003216129);中国社会科学院“哲学社会科学创新工程基础学者”资助计划

摘　　要：针对农地流转市场存在双边信息不对称议价的现实,基于Rubinstein讨价还价博弈刻画了农地流转双方的议价过程,根据子博弈精炼纳什均衡得到了均衡流转价格,最后利用有关数据进行了算例分析.研究发现:均衡流转价格与流入方议价能力负相关、与流出方议价能力正相关;在流出方先出价的不完全信息讨价还价博弈中,当流出方对流入方的策略空间了解的越准确,或者流入方对流出方的策略空间了解的越少时,均衡交易价格越高;另外,流转双方的心理预期价格越高,均衡交易价格也越高.将流转双方的讨价还价过程、信息结构、破裂点纳入到农地流转价格的研究,既兼顾了流出方和流入方的利益,为双方谈判和议价提供了理论上的指导,也为农地流转价格的研究提供了新的视角.Based on the Rubinstein bargaining game,the bargaining process with asymmetry information and the formation of equilibrium transfer price are analyzed.The results show that the equilibrium turnover price is negatively correlated with the bargaining power of the inflow party,and is positively correlated with the bargaining power of the outflow party.The more accurate the outflow party’s strategy space for the inflow party,the less the inflow party understands the policy space of the outflow party,the more the equilibrium transaction price.The higher of the psychological expectation price of both sides,the higher the equilibrium transaction price.On the basis of theoretical analysis,the analysis of examples under various parameters is carried out,and the correctness and validity of the relevant conclusions are further verified.

关 键 词：农地流转 讨价还价博弈 双边信息不对称 均衡流转价格 破裂点 

分 类 号：F321.1[经济管理—产业经济] F224.32