The Strategy of Escalation and Negotiation: The Iran Nuclear Dispute  

作　　者：Tobias W. Langenegger Keith W. Hipel 

机构地区：[1]Department of Management, Technology, and Economics, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland [2]Department of Systems Design Engineering, University of Waterloo, Waterloo Ontario, Canada

出　　处：《Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering》2019年第4期434-448,共15页系统科学与系统工程学报（英文版）

摘　　要：The strategic decisions and resulting consequences surrounding the conflict between the United States of America (US) and Iran regarding the Iranian nuclear program are formally investigated using a flexible decision methodology called the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR). This highly controversial dispute caught the world's attention as concerns were growing that Iran would reach a position where it would be able to build nuclear weapons, thereby posing a risk to world security. While Iran insisted on its rights for the peaceful use of nuclear technology;the international community;led by the US, tried to discourage the nuclear activities of Iran to ensure its obligations to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This led to an escalation of tension on both sides, with an extension of the nuclear program by Iran and an increase in sanctions by the US, before it was possible to arrive at a negotiated agreement. As demonstrated in this paper, a systematic GMCR investigation provides valuable strategic insights into this important conflict. Further, it illustrates ways in which the conflict could have evolved, as well as mechanisms for stopping an escalation like this in the future.

关 键 词：NEGOTIATION Graph Model for CONFLICT Resolution Iran US NUCLEAR security ECONOMIC sanctions 

分 类 号：N[自然科学总论]