同级医院信息共享行为的博弈分析  

Games of information sharing behaviors in hospitals at the same level

作　　者：刘雁灵[1] 李菲 LIU Yan-ling;LI Fei(Department of Mathematics, Changzhi Medical College,Changzhi 046000,Shanxi Province,China;Department of Health Information and Management,Changzhi Medical College, Changzhi 046000, Shanxi Province,China;China Institute of Scientific and Technological Information, Beijing 100038,China)

机构地区：[1]长治医学院数学教研室,山西长治046000 [2]长治医学院卫生信息与管理系,山西长治046000 [3]中国科学技术信息研究所,北京100038

出　　处：《中华医学图书情报杂志》2019年第5期69-72,共4页Chinese Journal of Medical Library and Information Science

基　　金：山西省软科学研究计划项目“区域卫生信息系统中利益相关者的博弈分析和激励机制研究”(2016041035-3);长治医学院博士启动基金项目“城市老年人信息需求与社会服务”(BS15016);长治医学院校级教学改革创新项目“《信息服务与用户》实践教学研究”(J2016018)

摘　　要：目的:对同级医院信息共享过程中的"囚徒困境"进行破解,为政府推进区域卫生信息化建设的政策制定提供理论依据。方法:构建不同条件下医院信息共享的博弈模型并进行分析。结果:激励机制、惩罚机制和被许可的合作试错是破解同级医院信息共享"囚徒困境"的有效措施。结论:政府通过建立激励机制和惩罚机制及合作进入退出机制等措施可促进同级医院间的信息共享行为。Objective To provide the theoretical basis for the governments to work out their policy for regional health information construction by analyzing the " prisoner’s dilemma" of information sharing behaviors in hospitals at the same level. Methods A game model of information sharing behaviors in hospitals under different conditions was established and analyzed. Results The incentive mechanism,punishment mechanism and permitted cooperative trial errors were the effective measures to crack the " prisoner’s dilemma" of information sharing behaviors in hospitals at the same level. Conclusion The incentive mechanism,punishment mechanism and permitted cooperative trial errors established by the governments can promote the information sharing in hospitals at the same level.

关 键 词：信息共享 囚徒困境 博弈模型 激励机制 惩罚机制 

分 类 号：R197.1[医药卫生—卫生事业管理] F224.32[医药卫生—公共卫生与预防医学]