市县审计机关管理改革框架研究——破解多重利益格局与阻滞效应  

Research on the Management Reform Mechanism of Audit Institutions in Cities and Counties:Cracking the Multi-interests Pattern and Blocking Effect

作　　者：郑国洪 黄冠华 ZHENG Guo-hong;HUANG Guan-hua(School of Business, Southwest University of Political Science & Law, Chongqing 401120, China;School of International Business, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing100029, China)

机构地区：[1]西南政法大学商学院,重庆401120 [2]对外经济贸易大学国际商学院,北京100029

出　　处：《西安财经学院学报》2019年第4期53-59,共7页Journal of Xi’an University of Finance & Economics

摘　　要：国家审计系统四级运行机制及其互动关系是审计制度的重要内容,特别是处于系统基层的市县审计机关经过博弈互动后对同级政府的监督往往存在阻滞效应。文章基于国家治理的现实需要,构建了地方政府在审计监督约束中的行为选择模型,并刻画出市县审计机关的激励机制,运用纳什均衡分析监督阻滞的制度根源。模型揭示了市县审计机关独立性威胁主要源于信息劣势地位、激励与成本不相容,导致其揭露、抵御和预防功能部分失灵。针对多重利益格局和阻滞效应的特点构建框架性对策以保障审计发挥国家治理的职能。There are obvious gaps in the research on the four-level operation mechanism of national audit office, hall, city bureau and county bureau in the state audit system. Especially at the grassroots level of the bureaucracy, the supervision of the county from county auditing authorities is under blocked. Based on the combination of economic utility, incentive and restraint, this paper constructs the behavior selection model of the local government in the same level of audit supervision and the incentive mechanism of the city and county audit bureau, and analyzes the blocking effect of supervision by the Nash equilibrium game theory.

关 键 词：国家审计 政府行为 市县审计机关 混合策略博弈 

分 类 号：F239.44[经济管理—会计学]