财政性教育投入与教育公平:一个偏好异质性的视角  

Fiscal Education Investment and Educational Equity: A Perspective of Preference Heterogeneity

作　　者：李盈萱 方毅[2] Li Yingxuan;Fang Yi

机构地区：[1]吉林大学商学院 [2]吉林大学数量经济研究中心

出　　处：《宏观经济研究》2019年第8期128-141,共14页Macroeconomics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“基于随机占优的高阶偏好投资组合构建”(项目号:71871104)的资助

摘　　要：从偏好异质性的角度,探讨财政性教育投入扩张对教育平等促进的效率与效果有重要的现实意义。本文通过构建基层政府与具有偏好异质性的当地居民之间的不完全信息动态博弈模型,并求解出精炼贝叶斯均衡实现的充分必要条件,对博弈过程中基层政府与当地居民的最优策略进行考察得到如下结论:第一,基层政府在选择是否扩张财政性教育投入的策略时,仅考虑当地居民的教育需求,忽略了当地居民的偏好异质性,这将导致区域内的普惠性财政教育投入扩张政策失效;第二,当地居民在选择是否向政府传递教育需求的信号时,不仅会受到政策收益与申请成本关系的影响,还会受到经济体内其他行为人的策略选择的影响;第三,在财政分权体制下,不同地域居民构成的差异不仅导致地域间私人部门教育投入的不均衡,还导致了地域间公共部门教育投入的不均衡;第四,中央财政分项目、按比例分担的特惠性财政政策能够有效缩小地域间财政性教育投入的差异,从而促进教育公平。It is of great significance to explore the efficiency and effectiveness of fiscal education investment expansion on promoting education equity considering preference heterogeneity. By constructing a dynamic game of incomplete information between the grassroots government and local residents, we draw the following conclusions. First, when the grassroots government chooses whether to expend the fiscal education investment, the only consideration is the education requirement of local residents. The neglect of preference heterogeneity may lead to low efficiency of inclusive fiscal policy. Secondly, when local residents transmit the signal of education requirements to the government, they will not only affected by the profit and the cost of the transmission, but also affected by other residents’ optimal strategies. Thirdly, under the fiscal decentralization, the different composition of residents lead to imbalance of both personal education investment and public education investment in different regions. Fourthly, the preferential fiscal policy will promote education equity.

关 键 词：不完全信息动态博弈 偏好异质性 财政性教育投入 教育公平 

分 类 号：F812.45[经济管理—财政学] G526.7[文化科学—教育学]