企业组织中的产权陷阱及其出路——关于“个人所有制”问题答韩立新先生  

Property Rights Trap and Its Way Out in Enterprise Organization ——Answering Mr. Han Lixin Involving "Personal Ownership"

作　　者：李惠斌[1] LI Huibin(Central Compilation & Translation Bureau,Beijing 100032,China)

机构地区：[1]中央编译局

出　　处：《经济与管理评论》2019年第5期12-18,共7页Review of Economy and Management

摘　　要：文章第一次提出马克思的“产权陷阱”理论,通过这一理论对于马克思和恩格斯提出的未来社会即社会主义初级阶段的产权问题进行了论述,据此对清华大学韩立新教授针对作者的“个人所有制”理论提出的“一人一票,还是一股一票”的问题做了回答。私有制产生之前的个人所有制与今天的更高层次上的个人所有制应该有什么区别?本文在运用马克思“产权陷阱”理论分析“一人一票”的原始共产主义产权模式弊端的基础上,从资本主义之后的个人所有制企业模式和市场经济条件下按劳分配的本质两个方面对马克思"重建个人所有制"的产权意蕴进行了解读,从马克思主义制度经济学的角度揭示了苏联经济模式的失败原因。This article puts forward Marx's theory of "property trap" for the first time and through which it discusses the issue of property rights proposed by Marx and Engels in the future society, that is, the primary stage of socialism. Based on this, it answered the question of "one person one vote, or one share one vote?" proposed by Professor Han Lixin of Tsinghua University on the author's "personal ownership" theory. What should be the difference between personal ownership before appearance of private ownership and that at a higher level today? This paper uses Marx's "property trap" theory to analyze the malpractices of the original communist property model of "one person one vote", and based on this, it interprets Marx's connotation of the property rights of "rebuilding individual ownership" from both the enterprise model of individual ownership after capitalism and the essence of distribution according to work under market economy conditions. From the perspective of Marxist institutional economics, it reveals the reasons for the failure of the Soviet Union economic model.

关 键 词：产权陷阱 个人所有制 按劳分配 企业组织模式 劳动股权 

分 类 号：F0-0[经济管理—政治经济学]